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Botnet is a serious threat to cyber-security. Botnet is a robot that can enter the computer 
and perform DDoS attacks through attacker’s command. Botnets are designed to extract 
confidential information from network channels such as LAN, Peer or Internet. They 
perform on hacker's intention through Command & Control(C&C) where attacker can 
control the whole network and can clinch illegal activities such as identity theft, 
unauthorized logins and money transactions. Thus, for security reason, it is very 
important to understand botnet behavior and go through its countermeasures. This thesis 
draws together the main ideas of network anomaly, botnet behavior, taxonomy of 
botnet, famous botnet attacks and detections processes. 
Based on network protocols, botnets are mainly 3 types: IRC, HTTP, and P2P botnet. 
All 3 botnet's behavior, vulnerability, and detection processes with examples are 
explained individually in upcoming chapters. Meanwhile saying shortly, IRC Botnet 
refers to early botnets targeting chat and messaging applications, HTTP Botnet targets 
internet browsing/domains and P2P Botnet targets peer network i.e. decentralized 
servers. Each Botnet's design, target, infecting and spreading mechanism can be 
different from each other. For an instance, IRC Botnet is targeted for small environment 
attacks where HTTP and P2P are for huge network traffic. Furthermore, detection 
techniques and algorithms filtration processes are also different among each of them. 
Based on these individual botnet's behavior, many research papers have analyzed 
numerous botnet detection techniques such as graph-based structure, clustering 
algorithm and so on. Thus, this thesis also analyzes popular detection mechanisms, 
C&C channels, Botnet working patterns, recorded datasets, results and false positive 
rates of bots prominently found in IRC, HTTP and P2P.  
Research area covers C&C channels, botnet behavior, domain browsing, IRC, 
algorithms, intrusion and detection, network and peer, security and test results. Research 
articles are conducted from scientific books through online source and University of 
Turku library. 
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Botnet is mostly used for illegal activities such as identity theft, unauthorized logins and 
DDoS attacks to Network (LAN, Peer-to-Peer & Internet) or protocol (IRC, HTTP & 
P2P). For the process, attacker first designs bot structure which is based on attack 
intentions and durations. We will go through possible attack intentions on individual 
botnet types in coming chapters. Next, on completion of bot structure, bot is formed and 
is deployed to the targeted network. After that, mutual communication between network 
and attacker’s computer is established where the infected network is known as botnet. 
Finally, attacker is able to perform any intended actions such as identity theft, 
unauthorized logins and confidential information retrieval.  
Botnet is also called a bot which refers to robot and operates through Command and 
Control (C&C) channel. C&C is a method to deploy command on machine and control 
through it. In botnet, C&C is used by programming code to establish communication 
between bot and network as well to operate any illegal activities as mentioned above. In 
C&C process, attackers sending commands to bots are known as "Botmaster". 
Botmasters are often called for "Botherder" or "Botcontroller too" [1]. Botmasters can 
send commands from a remote location without prior knowledge of the network 
administrator and can infect multiple computers at a time. Such infected computers are 
known as "Zombie Computers". When infected, zombie computers starts to operate 
through Botmaster commands and becomes bot [2]. 
A bot is designed initially through object-oriented programming such as Java and C#. 
Designed structure is then deployed to targeted network through malware. While 
designing, it is taken into consideration that bot follows botmaster’s commands and 
maintains the connection. On deployment to network, bot starts infecting the computer 
and establishes third-party control (i.e. C&C). During the process, malware can be 
passed through different means like an external drive, online hacking, human elements, 
driver installation and many more. When a bot communication is established, it 
performs activities according to botmasters command for intended purposes, especially 
illegal activities such as email spam, identity theft, DDoS, monitoring browser history, 
access files or bank card details and spreading malware. Furthermore, Botnet can 
 2 
expand over every node of the network and can infect every single computer inside the 
network. This way an entire network can be under control of attacker through Botnet 
and C&C [3]. Thus, Botnet is a serious cyber-security threat today affecting numerous 
scientific fields, financial fields, education, healthcare, finance and law enforcement 
fields.  
While briefing about Botnets behavior, each Botnet’s nature and intrusion processes are 
different based on network protocols. In this thesis I have decided to cover mainly 3 
protocols (IRC, HTTP, and P2P) where individual Botnet examples, behavior and 
detection processes are explained thoroughly in individual chapters. In this thesis, we 
begin at Chapter 2 with botnet overview, botnet lifecycle about initial infection, bot's 
purpose, and possible threats.  
Next in Chapter 3, Anomaly Detection Technique (ADT) is explained about cyber-
security and based models. After that, detailed information's on individual Botnet’s 
behavior with possible threats, detection methods, algorithms, results and evaluation are 
presented in Chapter 4, 5 and 6 respectively. Furthermore, existing theories and results 
like Botsniffer and graph-based C&C algorithms over local servers and Peer networks 
are also explained under the corresponding topics.  
Finally, in Chapter 7, my comparative analysis over individual Botnet (IRC, HTTP, and 
P2P), botnet’s behavior, vulnerability, similarities, detection process, experimental 












The Internet is widely used all over the world for communication and data transfer. 
Internet has also changed means of security surveillance, money transactions through 
online payments, operating devices (IoT), travel and appointment bookings and many 
more. Whenever people face difficulties with something like travelling to new city or 
curiosity on information, they can simply turn on their internet device such as phone, 
tablet and computers to check for solution. So far, internet has made human daily life as 
possibly as it can in many ways and has always been with us as a closest friend. With 
all these great features also come online security and threats where some unknown user 
can be monitoring the device and activities to retrieve any personal information known 
for intrusion.  Intrusion is any unauthorized activities happening to internet like identity 
theft, unauthorized logins, confidential file retrieval and unauthorized transactions 
without prior permission of the owner. This has been a huge cyber security threat today 
and are happening through various means like viruses, malware, phishing, spamming 
and many more. Among all these different threats, I find Botnet as the biggest threat 
because it can operate through C&C channel, more destructive in nature and can spread 
to millions in number. Furthermore, Botnet can act active or silent based on attack 
duration and botmasters commands. It can also update and maintain itself as per the 
received command making it strong and effective. They are also hard to be detected by 
antivirus or any simple IDs making it vulnerable [4].   
 
The primary motive for creating Bot is to achieve financial gain or access unauthorized 
information. As per the motive, a bot is designed to be installed in a client machine i.e. 
computer device through external means like hard drive, phishing, spam or malware and 
after installation can be controlled by botmaster’s command establishing mutual 
communication. When communication is established, Botmaster can control the device 
and execute any intended actions such as DDoS attacks. On this process, Botmaster's 
computer is far away from the targeted place and being remote he can monitor targeted 
addresses. Botmaster often hacks another IP's and use them as its own to prevent from 
ID as well as to make the detection task difficult [4]. More information about 
Botmaster, Bot's lifecycle, purpose, and residing machine are covered on this chapter. 
 4 
2.1 Botnet lifecycle 
Botnet lifecycle in this section represents botnet working mechanism from initial 
infection on the computer to server destruction as shown in Figure 1. While entering the 
network, bot first hijacks single node of the network and spreads throughout the 
available devices. For hijacking single node, botmaster need to install bot-code via web-
links, phishing emails and fake advertises. Depending on the protocol platform (IRC, 
HTTP or P2P), bot-code is installed, and bot is formed [1]. 
 
 
Figure 1: Infected Botnet Cycle [1] 
 
Figure 1 shows Botnet lifecycle process starting with initial infection on the computer. 
On this process, botmaster uses remote IP address to deploy bot into targeted network's 
computer and initial infection happens. After that, commands are returned, and mutual 
communication is established as shown in step 2. Next, botmaster uses C&C channel on 
the infected machine for mutual communication and bots are expanded through every 
node of the network and the main server too. Once the communication is established on 
the main server, botmaster can perform any malicious activities like information 
retrieve and identity theft as shown in step 3-4. Furthermore, botmaster can update and 
provide maintenance to bots as per the need through C&C. Finally, when the DDoS 
attacks are performed, installed bots can be removed or can be inside the network un 
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touched. This is a typical Botnet Lifecycle and may vary based on protocol and network 
(IRC, HTTP, and P2P). They are explained separately in upcoming chapters with 
examples [1]. 
 
2.2 Bots Purpose 
Similar to many other cybercrimes, bots’ purpose is also to monitor user's activity, 
unauthorized logins, identity theft, and data retrieval. With received information, 
attacker can transfer funds, open accounts, and gather any needed information. As bot 
start to spread, they can also collect sensitive information like keys user presses on the 
keyboard, monitor screen information, health information and retrieve web browsing 
history. With such information's, attacker can simply extract victim’s behavior, 
emotions, part of interests or any hidden secrets. It is close enough to read people's 
mind or personal diary [5]. Key point is that, once bot is installed in the computer, it has 
many open spaces for attacks and its purpose is determined from botmaster’s intention. 
Thus, all user should have proper information on botnet and proper detection techniques 
should be applied to their devices. Botnet detection techniques are explained according 
to targeted network on upcoming chapters separately. But before that, it is important to 
know about bot residing machines and Anomaly Detection Technique explained in the 
next sections. 
 
2.3 Potential Targets 
Approximately 3 billion people, i.e. half of the world's population, are Internet users [4]. 
These users have several communicating devices connected to the Internet every day. 
Users can be tricked to perform activities such as downloading malware and visiting 
malicious content. While visiting those contents, bots are also installed on the device 
without prior knowledge of the user and the device becomes bot residing machine or 
zombie computers. All installed bots inside the computer stays quiet until commands 
are applied or discovered by the bot detector. Thus, the user won't even notice when 
bots are on their devices and unauthorized data transfer might occur leading to serious 
threats. This way without prior knowledge of the user, millions of bots are installed to 
devices all over the world. Furthermore, Cisco estimates, by 2020, internet devices will 
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be 50 billion and with potential chances of bot-residing machine, bots will be spreading 
in huge size [6].   
On the other hand, IoT devices are on high demands these days where modern devices 
like GPS devices, kitchen appliances, home-security, heating-system, and air-flow are 
monitored throughout the internet. Imagine someone is monitoring all these basic 
activities far away from user's location through bot and all cameras, entered passwords, 
etc. are recorded. Depending on the attacker's intention, he can accomplish anything 
needed including health concerns and private information leading to blackmailing as 
well as huge financial destruction [4]. Thus, proper detection plan is needed for all 
electronic devices operating through internet too. Meanwhile, destruction level and 
vulnerability in this process also depends on the type of Botnet and are explained in 
Botnet Taxonomy section below. 
 
2.4 Botnet Taxonomy 
Botnet was first noticed at instant messaging application in 1999 as "Pretty Park" [7]. 
By that time, bots used to be less vulnerable and could affect only one specific device at 
a time. But then, bot started to evolve with more stability and robustness. Slowly, it 
started affecting a huge area of browsing environment and multiple servers. 
Destructions started to count in billions of dollars. Thus, it is very important to 
understand Botnet nature and Taxonomy where Botnet Taxonomy is based on Botnet 
behavior to their server-side application, destructive nature and evolution. 
IRC, HTTP, and Peer-to-Peer Botnets are mainly 3 types of Botnet that falls under 
Botnet Taxonomy and are counted as the biggest threat to cyber-security. They are 
categorized through centralized, distributed and peer network channel which covers 
instant messaging application, browsing application, and server-side environment. We 
are going to discuss on individual Botnet Taxonomy working mechanism, destructive 
nature, examples, attack methods, and detection processes in upcoming chapters 























3 Anomaly Detection Technique 
Anomaly refers to abnormal data flow behavior for unauthorized logins, intrusions, or 
unusual transactions. In this chapter, we are going to consider Botnet as our anomaly 
and focus mainly on its detection processes. For the detection process, Anomaly 
Detection Technique (ADT) is widely used technique, where detection principles and 
algorithms are used to observe anomalies. Detection technique contains the layer of 
filters process to separate doubtful traffic from normal traffic and algorithms are 
implemented accordingly detecting the bug [8]. 
Depending on the server-side platform, ADT is categorized into Host-based Intrusion 
Detection (HID) and Network based Intrusion Detection [9]. HID can perform only one 
specific server at a time and secures the system by monitoring over incoming as well as 
outgoing traffic. During the process, unusual behaviors are scanned, and alert messages 
are delivered to the administration. On the other hand, Network-based ID are targeted 
for peer networks and are meant to cover whole available servers. Network-based ID 
are installed on prime points of the incoming and outgoing traffic to detect unusual 
behaviors. Firewall is one good example of Network based ID [10]. 
ADT has been widely researched and discussed in literature. One example is DTRAB, 
introduced by Fadlullah et al. [11] and updated at [12], which works by detecting 
anomalies in the protocol. Furthermore, DTRAB can also be used to construct a 
defensive platform for tracing back the attacker [11]. Another example is the framework 
for observing 5G networks proposed by Yan, Zhang & Vasilakos [13].  It is targeted 
mainly for future network generations which will be highly virtualized and software-
defined. Furthermore, Shu [14] has also presented a qualitative comparison of particular 
advantages and disadvantages on a Software Defined Network(SDN). This will help to 
understand data forwarding layer, control layer and application layer to apply required 
countermeasures. 
Although lots of theories and experiments have been conducted, ADT provided for 
current generation and next evolving generation might fall short [10]. It is because 
botnets can easily adapt to encrypted commands and do not cover rule-based 
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architecture. Such way, botmasters can examine existing countermeasures and modify 
their bots preventing detections. Thus, a long-term vision is needed for botnet detection 
and network security. We will discuss anomaly architectures, methods for IDS, and 
evaluation of results. 
3.1 Anomaly Detection Architecture 
ADT based architecture is carried out mainly from three factors i.e. sensors, analyzers, 
and UI. Architecture is designed in a way that firstly Network data is collected through 
software components [10] and are passed through the sensor.  After that, collected data 
is passed to an analyzer where algorithms are implemented to check for the intrusion 
behavior. Software and algorithms used in this analyzing process may vary depending 
on the network protocol. When the intrusion is detected, an alert message is sent to the 
system. Administration department will be able to see the alert through UI and are able 
to react accordingly. Figure 3 shows how data is passed through the FW, Sensor, 
Analyzer, and UI. [10] 
 
 
Figure 3: ADT components [10] 
 
Implementing anomaly architecture and going through its supervision are both 
important roles from the security point of view [6]. Algorithms and software are one 
part of security as explained above but using them on a specific location is also very 
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important for significant results. Figure 4 below shows an implementation of an 
architecture for Network-based ID where the attacker creates multiple Bots through 
C&C and tries to enter the system, but Firewall prevents them from entering and 
protecting the whole network. The firewall in Figure 4 is kept in a way that secures 
entire perimeter of the victim's network and monitors doubtful traffic. Such way any 
suspicious incoming traffic like bots are blocked and are passed through security 
department by alerts. 
 
 
Figure 4: Network-based IPS [6] 
After Firewall situations are taken into proper consideration, comes supervision on 
dataset and labeling. Based on normal or abnormal behavior, labeling is done to all 
collected data sets. This helps to understand the nature of Bots and protect the network 
in future from similar intrusions too. Methods for labeling are supervised, semi-
supervised and unsupervised based on the destructive nature of anomalies. Some 
popular examples containing datasets labeling are K-nearest neighbor, Multi-layer 
perceptron, Support Vector Machines (SVM), k-means clustering, self-organizing maps 
(SOM) and so on [10]. All above examples have their own data sets to compare the 
incoming/outgoing traffic and separate the doubtful traffics. Thus, such labeling are 
used in many detection applications to compare the nature of intrusions too. We will be 
discussing few detection applications like Botsniffer, graph-based clustering algorithm 
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and neutral classification analysis in each botnet taxonomy section through upcoming 
chapters starting with popular ADT methods in next section. 
 
 
3.2 Methods for ADT 
Several methods are introduced for ADT among which Statistical based, Cognition-
based, User-Identification based, and Machine Learning based are popular methods 
used for Botnet Detection. Figure 5 gives a tree-structure of these Detection-based 
mechanisms and are shortly described in individual sub sections below. 
 
 
























3.2.1 Statistical Based 
Statistical based method is carried out on the observation of statistics collected from 
network data traffic. Here, the algorithm collects network traffic data for a long time 
and their patterns are observed. After that, Threshold metrics [16] are implemented to 
analyze data and any information deviated from the normal data are counted as an 
anomaly. Next, required removal processes are implemented depending on the nature of 
anomaly and network traffic observation processes are updated. Ghorbani et al. [16] 
have proposed wavelet time series analysis and system identification theory through 
Statistical based method for anomaly detection. In his process, normal window is 
separated using wave approx. and regressive tool to compare the incoming traffic. 
Furthermore, other ID methods such as Markov Process/Marker, Operational, 
Multivariate and Statistical methods are also carried out through Statistical based 
method. On one hand, statistical based method is suitable to filter doubtful traffic and 
detect bots but on the other hand, process is expensive to implement and operate [15]. 
 
3.2.2 Cognition Based 
Cognition-based method is also known for Cognitive models or Expert Systems. It is 
focused mainly on the audit of data classification. In this method, whitelist separation 
rules and awareness procedures are predefined. With classification rules, huge traffic is 
separated from the suspicious traffic and botnets are detected. Decision trees, adept 
systems, and finite state machines are few examples of cognition-based ID method [10]. 
3.2.3 Machine Learning Based 
Machine Learning Based method uses vector machines to detect Bots from doubtful 
traffic. Here, vector machine collects the information on doubtful data traffic and 
depending on the network, HID or NID is installed to detect possible threats. The big 
drawback on the process is that most systems are passive and communication between 
the sender and the receiver is not in real time. Furthermore, IDS can observe and 
identify the administration but cannot take actions due to the false alarm issue. Thus, the 
method needs manual effort for threats removal on detected intrusions. On the other 
hand, hackers can control the system in the absence of an administrator even though 
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strong access and authentication are implemented. Thus, Machine learning can be a 
good platform to control ID issues only on large networks with the presence of an 
observer [17]. Some popular methods under Machine Learning platform are explained 
shortly in Table 1  [10]: 
 
Methods Description 
Fuzzy logic Based on fuzzy data sets with unidentified boundaries. 
Bayesian Networks Graph model based to encode relation among data sets. 
Genetic Algorithm Chooses successful parental generation and updates 
solution for                               the problem. 
Neutral Network Uses parallel simple algorithms to classify complex issues 
Distance based       Calculates the distance between two data class and 
observes similarity. 
Probabilistic method Works on the assumption of parametric and nonparametric 
approach. 
Kernel based             Uses the method to project non-linearly separable data to 
space where data is linearly separable. 
  
Table 1: Machine Learning based Methods [10] 
3.2.4 User Identification Based 
User Identification Based model monitors user behavior and figures out data sets pattern 
to separate doubtful traffic. On the process, any unnatural acts of data flows are taken as 
an anomaly. But the false alarm is high in this process because user's behavior might 
vary all the time. This way, from attacker's point of view, it isn't hard to analyze 
software detection model and divert attacking pattern preventing from being detected 
[10]. 
3.2.5  Computer Immunology Based 
Computer immunology-based methods uses principles similar to human body immune 
system, ‘prevention is better than cure'. Like anti capsules are taken for the disease, 
anti-intrusion patterns are used in this model. When intruders try to enter the network, 
their connection attempts are monitored and mobilized. Many AI systems based on 
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software and algorithms are deployed in this process for immunity. During the 
analyzing process, software also develops its ability to detect vulnerabilities and adapt 
to the self-learning environment [10].   
3.3 Evaluation of Results 
By this section, we are already familiar with intrusion, botnet, botnet detection methods, 
and Algorithm. Furthermore, detailed structure of taxonomy and detection examples 
will be discussed in coming chapters. So far, it is understood that Botnet detection 
principles are based on analysis of datasets collected and implementation of software 
algorithms. During this process, error rates are the main issues to evaluate the detection 
application. Error rates refer to possibility of errors that can happen during the 
experiment. Error rates can be in any algorithm or software to examine the efficiency of 
method. Applications resulting on high error rates might show secured data as anomaly 
and doubtful data as secured leading to false results. So, higher the error rates refer to 
less efficiency of the application. Thus, lower error rate is necessary in an application to 
get effective result. Error rates can be determined by several terms below: 
 
• False Positive  : Known as a false alarm, when expected for 
something negative but comes positive 
• False Negative  : Known as missed detection error, when expected 
for something positive but comes negative 
• True Positive  : Doubted datasets marked exactly an anomaly 
• True Negative  : Secure datasets marked as safe [10]. 
 
While detecting botnet, false rates are important to consider in algorithms and improve 
the efficiency of experiments [10]. We will be going through individual botnet 
behavior, intrusions, detection model and false rate evaluation in individual botnet types 









4 Internet Relay Chat Botnet 
Internet Relay Chat (IRC) is an application theme protocol operating in the form of text. 
In IRC, text conversation known for "chat" works as a centralized server networking 
model. Internet Relay Chat clients are computer program user who runs the chat 
application installed on their computer. IRC was initially designed for group 
communication and with the evolving process covered private chat, data transfer and 
file transfer. As the program began to expand, loopholes were also generated resulting 
cyber security threats, and among which, one is IRC Botnet. This chapter covers 
information about IRC Botnet behavior, examples, vulnerabilities, security, detection 
methods, algorithm and test results [18].  
Among botnets, IRC Botnet is popular among botmaster due to its easy architecture and 
understandable working mechanism. It is targeted for small attacks where algorithms 
and designs are kept simple making it easy to handle. The first IRC Botnet was created 
by JellFisher in 1993 with the name "Eggdrop" and still being maintained with IRC 
based backdoor. Eggdrop was widely used over the time as non-malicious bot [19] due 
to less vulnerable. Eggdrop that time was able to withdraw only small section of chat 
information’s.  After that many other IRC Botnets were introduced and one is 
"PrettyPark" established also in 1993 [7]. "PrettyPark" sends information to Botmaster 
every 30 seconds and make sure it stays alive within the channel. While being in the 
channel, it can receive commands and access information's such as Computer name, 
Product name, Product key, registrations, ICQ details, email addresses, and passwords. 
[7] 
4.1 IRC Botnet Behavior 
IRC Botnets are First generation and less vulnerable botnets in comparison to HTTP 
and P2P botnets. IRC botnets are less vulnerable because they can target small network 
or specific one computer at a time. On the other hand, anti-malware can easily detect 
most of the IRC Botnets and can remove them from the system. Though IRC Botnets 
are less destructive and have less efficiency, they are popular among hackers due to its 
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good interactive behavior, low latency, easy handling and maintenance. In terms of 
result, it has low false alarm as well as high accuracy and if left undetected, can take 
down big servers too.  Thus, botmaster's first choice has always been IRC botnet when 
attack intentions are targeted for small network to achieve specific details [8]. 
Furthermore, on how IRC attacks are performed is explained below in intrusion section. 
4.2 IRC Intrusions 
Botmaster can perform various actions like extract confidential information, spy, 
monitor chats, identity-theft, access bank details, passwords and so on through IRC 
botnet intrusion. For the process, botmaster first designs IRC bot and deploy it for 
installation to the targeted host where mutual communication between host and 
botmaster is established. Figure 6 shows IRC botnet intrusion process with steps and are 
explained below [20]. 
 
 
Figure 6: IRC based Botnet Lifecycle [20] 
 
As shown in Figure 6, Botmaster first uses remote IP address and exploits bot to the 
host. Upon exploitation, bots are downloaded, and binary code are installed. Once 
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installation is completed, every bot on botnet is under control of botmaster through 
C&C channel and IRC server is connected through DNS query as shown in Step 3 of 
the figure. Here, bot starts with PASS message to the IRC server and server 
authenticates the bot by validating its password establishing the communication. In 
many situations, not only bots but botmaster also needs to validate himself to the server. 
Once the authentication process is completed, the connection criteria between bot, 
botmaster, and server is completed. Finally, the system is now under the control and to 
begin a DDoS attack, botmaster can simple send command as "ddos.start victim_ip" 
where all bots get the command and attack the server as shown in step 8 of the figure 
above [20]. 
4.3 IRC Intrusion Records 
In early periods of internet, hacks and attacks were meant to be for information, 
curiosity, bug exposure and unauthorized login. But modern IRC attacks not only 
exploited stealthy mechanisms but also disrupted their resources and connections to get 
into the system. Amount of loss covered by intrusion is getting bigger, mostly related to 
huge financing sector [21]. Record [22] says that millions of IRC users just in America 
and many more in world-wide uses instant messaging services like AOL messenger and 
ICQ being potential IRC botnet victims. Many intrusions are encountered on a daily 
basis within these applications and some large attacks encountered are listed below 
caused by IRC intrusion: 
 
- In Romania, one of the largest IRC Network was attacked by DDoS and much 
of its services were shut down [23]. 
- Many ISP have been hit in France and Netherlands within last few years from 
DDoS IRC botnet attacks [23]. 
- Undernet is known for one of the largest networks with 45 servers in 35 
countries communicating over 100,000 people every week. According to 
Undernet, many servers were controlled with tidal waves of IRC data.  
- In February 2017, huge sites like Yahoo, eBay, Amazon, the FBI and many 




Though IRC botnets are considered less vulnerable, it can lead to huge loss if necessary 
actions are not applied in time. Thus, it is important to know the behavior of latest 
recorded IRC Bots as well as provide necessary precautions to the server and in next 
section below we are going to shortly discuss popular IRC Botnet detections methods. 
 
4.4 IRC Botnet Detection  
Many theories and experiments were conducted to detect IRC intrusion and prevent the 
system from intrusion [21]. In this section, popular IRC botnet detection programs are 
explained briefly.  
 
In 2006, Dagon et al., [24] explained a program focusing on time patterns to monitor 
botnet activities based on IRC protocol. IRC protocol was very congenial at this period 
and IRC channel operators used to handle the channel as well as monitor them 
automatically. While monitoring, any doubtful traffics were separated and preventive 
measures were applied for the security. 
 
Furthermore, W.T. Strayers and his researcher friends developed metrics-based flow 
analysis [25] where IRC sessions are filtered out first and flow metrics are applied to 
detect IRC botnet from normal traffic. 
 
Later, network layer and application layer combine analysis research was delivered to 
cyber-security [21] that filters the traffic based on centralized or decentralized server 
and observes the result separating an anomaly. Besides them, many machine learning 
techniques and AI were added in the detection process giving buzz, ring or notification 
alarms to the operator about IRC intrusion and making the detection task stronger [21].  
 
In [26], Rajab et al. approached distributed monitoring based on network (centralized 
and decentralized), and separate doubtful traffic from the dataflow. Similarly, many 
other monitoring services have been introduced including domain and DNS for 
blacklisting IRC botnet from the data traffic. Though many approaches have been 
introduced, security implementation depends on organization point of view, data-traffic, 
security importance, previous hacks, and loopholes. No matter what, all IRC detection 
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process follows common Traffic Application Classification process to separate IRC 
traffic from whole network and detect botnet and is explained in next section below 
[21]. 
 
4.5 IRC Traffic Application Classification 
Traffic application Classification based security is a list of process to determine 
intrusion from the big data traffic. In our case, IRC Traffic Analysis is used to detect the 
IRC Botnet and the process is as shown in the Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7: Traffic Analysis Framework [21] 
 
In the beginning, all incoming and outgoing data-traffics are separated into IRC or non-
IRC traffic. The separation process is not mandatory but reducing big volume of traffic 
for computation gives significant result and very low false alarm. Then, IRC traffics are 
passed through the sniffer to be decoded where alerts are used for intrusion and after 
observation, doubtful IRC botnets are labeled as anomaly. Finally, IRC doubted traffics 
are analyzed and passed through the detection engine as shown in Figure 7 where IRC 
Botnet is detected [21].  
Among many Traffic Analysis framework applications, "Botsniffer" is one application 
that uses similar process for IRC detection and is a good example to see algorithms as 

















Botsniffer is a life-cycle approach for IRC Botnet detection. It starts with filtration of 
doubtful traffic, implementation of algorithm for detection process and leads through 
alert message to the administration department. Botsniffer works without prior 
knowledge of signatures on server addresses and follows IRC Traffic Analysis method 
as explained in previous section. Botsniffer is also based on the study of spatial-
temporal correlation and similarity with previously recorded IRC botnets. Spatial-
temporal correlation refers to any unnatural activities like coordinated communication, 
unauthorized logins, and intrusions that are observed from the bot's behavior. In this 
section, we are going to cover its behavior, botnet attacks, Botsniffer architecture, 
algorithm, test results and evaluation for IRC botnet detection [27]. 
4.6.1 Architecture and Algorithm 
In centralized C&C system, Botsniffer can perform mainly two types of operation i.e. 
"push" and "pull". IRC based C&C falls under push operation where messages are 
pushed or commanded to bots. On the other hand, Pull style is used for HTTP based 
browsing operation. Detection methods and implemented algorithms are different in 
both push and pull style operations as one is messaging application based and another is 
internet browsing based. Lots of existing Botnets such as Phatbot, GTBot, Sdbot, 
Spybot, Rbot/Rxbot and so on uses IRC push C&C. Figure 8(a) shows botnet’s push-
style C&C on IRC and 8(b) shows communication process with explanation below [27]. 
 
 






Figure 8(b) C&C Communication [27] 
 
Figure 8(a) and 8(b) shows initial infection and bot code for push style attacks through 
C&C channel where botmaster uses IRC intrusion process as explained in previous 
section [4.1.2]. With initial deployment of IRC bot, establishes communication through 
authentication. When communication platform is established, various commands like 
‘.bot.about' to receive information about the bot, ‘bot.sysinfo' to achieve information 
about the system, ‘scan.start' to scan the network as well as receive every details and 
‘CSendFile(0x46E--):Transfer to X.X.Finished' to transfer files to the designated 
address are deployed. These are typical IRC botnet intrusion processes and commands 
for the intrusion. To determine the detection process, such command behaviors are 
studied properly, and architecture is designed. After that algorithms are generated to 




Figure 9: Botsniffer Architecture [27] 
 
Botsniffer architecture is mainly based on two components: monitor engine and 
correlation engine as shown in Figure 9. Monitor engine is exploited at the perimeter of 
the design where it monitors traffic activities and senses suspicious traffics. In this 
process, firstly whitelists such as Internet Control Message Protocol(ICMP) and User 
Datagram Protocol(UDP) are filtered out to reduce traffic load. ICMP and UDP 
encountered during the process are filtered out as whitelist because they are less 
suspicious and doesn’t exchange data between the servers. After that, filtered traffic's 
behavior are studied and IRC traffic related spam as well as doubtful traffics are passed 
through the activity log and through the correlation engine. In activity log, information 
received from monitor engine is studied properly and in correlation engine, algorithm 
tests are applied where botnets are confirmed, and reports are submitted with alert 
notification. An example of detection algorithm is explained in next section below [27]. 
4.6.2 Botsniffer Detection Algorithm  
Botsniffer uses multiple algorithms on IRC botnet detection process such as IRC 
filtration process, whitelist separation process and monitoring message response 
process. Detailed information on all these algorithm processes can be achieved from 
[27] and among all we are going to discuss message response i.e. Response Crowd 
Homogeneity algorithm to get an idea on how botnet detection algorithm and testing 
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works. Response Crowd Homogeneity algorithm monitors message response traffic and 
triggers on suspicious traffic passing through correlation engine. For this process, 
mainly 2 algorithms (i) hypothesis for being botnet (E[n|H1]) and (ii) hypothesis for not 
being botnet (E[n|H0]) is applied.  Here, hypothesis parameters are taken as well as 
probability of being botnet is determined from algorithm below: 
 
For being Botnet: 
 
E[N|H1] = 
β ln (β/1− α) + (1− β) ln (1− β)/ α
θ1 ln (θ1/ θ0)+(1− θ1) ln (1− θ1)/(1− θ0)
 
   
Where,  
H1 = Hypothesis for botnet 
H0 = Hypothesis for not botnet 
θ1 = Probability for H1 
θ0 = Probability for H0 
α = User chosen false positive probabilities 
β = User chosen false negative probabilities 
 
 
















On this calculation, θ, α and β values are obtained from earlier filtration and Response 
crowd density check algorithm processes [27]. Finally, a table is made with the 
encountered data and are analyzed as datasets from all algorithms. Based on the 
collected datasets, analysis and evaluation operation is conducted. 
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4.6.3 Datasets and Evaluation 
In [27], multiple network traces were observed from the university and Botsniffer was 
used for IRC traffic flow observation. The total duration of the traces were 189 days and 
eight ports for IRC traffic with port no. 6667 were labeled as IRC-n [n = 1-8]. Other 










IRC-1 54MB 17h 189,421  10,530 2,957 0 
IRC-2 14MB 433h 33,320  4,061 335 0 
IRC-3 516MB 1,626h 2,073,587  4,577 563 6 
IRC-4 620MB 673h 4,071,707  24,837 228 3 
IRC-5 3MB 30h 19,190  24 17 0 
IRC-6 155MB 1686h 1,033,318  6,981 85 1 
IRC-7 60MB 429h 393,185  717 209 0 
IRC-8 707MB 1,010h 2,818,315  28,366 2,454 1 
All-1 4.2GB 10m 4,706,803  14,475 1,625 0 
All-2 6.2GB 10m 6,769,915  28,359 1,576 0 
All-3 7.6GB 1h 16,523,826  331,706 1,717 0 
All-4 15GB 1.4h 21,312,841  110,852 2,140 0 
All-5 24.5GB 5h 43,625,604  406,112 2,601 0 
 
Table 2: Normal traffic traces(left column) and Detection results(right column) [27] 
  
Table 2 as shown above can be separated into two columns: left column and right 
column. Left column shows information of all traces with trace size, duration and 
packets received during the observation. On the other hand, right side shows doubtful 
data flows and traffics that went through server with false positive rate. FP reading as 0 
means that there is no error in the calculation and greater the number results to decrease 
in efficiency of the result [27]. 
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Finally, when doubtful traffics were passed though correlation engine, multiple bots 
were encountered and encountered bots are mentioned in Table 3 as B-IRC, V-Bots and 
HTTP bots with its traced size, duration, packet size, and TCP-flow. This test result was 
retrieved with separate algorithms for HTTP bots also and in our case for IRC Botnet 
Detection, targeted bots resulted as B-IRC bots. Results from the conducted experiment 
show very low false alarm and high accuracy for the IRC hypothesis algorithm but 
many false readings were also conducted in other network traces [27]. 
 
BotTrace Trace Size Duration Pkt TCP flow Detected 
B-IRC-G 950k 8h 4,447 189 Yes 
B-IRD-J-1 - - 143,431 - Yes 
B-IRC-J-2 - - 262,878 - Yes 
V-Rbot 26MB 1,267s 347,153 103,425 Yes 
V-Spybot 15MB 1,931s 180,822 147,921 Yes 
V-Sdbot 66KB 533s 474 14 Yes 
B-HTTP-I 6MB 3.6h 65,695 237 Yes 
B-HTTP-II 37MB 19h 395,990 792 Yes 
 












5 HTTP Botnet 
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is a communication protocol based on logical 
links, texts, pictures and so on through centralized web browsing server. HTTP services 
are widely chosen services all over the world and are being used every day for online 
bookings, data transfer, emails, and payments and many more.  HTTP services can auto-
update as well as self-refresh too. With these great features also comes HTTP botnet as 
a drawback to HTTP services. Botmaster leaving bots to HTTP protocols are known for 
HTTP botnets and is an evolution to IRC Botnet. In IRC channel, bots are always 
connected to the system, but in HTTP, botmaster can turn bots on or off depending on 
the attack types. It means that, once bot is installed in the protocol, it can be kept silent 
until needed without any suspicions [28] and when needed can be activated through 
C&C channel making HTTP botnet more vulnerable than the IRC botnet.  
In system state, HTTP botnet uses port number 80 allowing traffic to bypass the firewall 
and making it hard to detect during ID [28]. So, HTTP botnet can lead to huge loss, and 
it is very important to understand HTTP botnets behavior as well as go through its 
countermeasures. This chapter covers detailed analysis of HTTP botnet's behavior, 
intrusions, algorithms, detection, and evaluations. 
HTTP Botnet is also known for Second Generation botnet which started in 2003 as 
‘Phabot' [29]. HTTP botnets purpose is also similar to IRC such as DDoS attack, 
identity theft, malware spreading, spam, and fraud. When HTTP protocol was 
introduced in 1999, no one thought that it will be widely used all over the world and 
could lead to huge destruction as well as breach in privacy. And blocking all HTTP 
services as precaution is also not effective solution [30]. On the other hand, research on 
HTTP based botnets is found to be very low, especially when generation is mobile 
friendly, and intrusion is happening regularly.   
Comparing to scalability on IRC, HTTP botnets can have wide number of bots which is 
comparatively dangerous but less interactive than IRC. Depending on the attack size, 
HTTP bots can be multiplied easily through C&C channel and pass through the 
designated area. It also uses simple code to control the bot and uses Bulletproof hosting 
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for efficient online spamming. HTTP botnets are installed initially through fake 
advertises on the webpage (especially adult pages and gambling sites). For the 
installation, people are tricked to go through the advertisement and meanwhile, IP 
details and related information's are sent to the botmaster. More information on 
intrusion will be discussed in the next section [3]. 
5.1 HTTP Botnet Intrusion  
HTTP Botnet uses HTTP POST REQUEST method for the intrusion and are passed 
through malicious websites into victim's computer [31]. Intrusion can relate many 
attacks depending on botmaster's needs, among which one is port scanning where HTTP 
bot scans ports to figure available services and active ports are analyzed. Another is the 
DDoS attack, where numerous unauthorized requests are passed through the server 
making it occupied resulting decrease in efficiency of the server. Next one is HTTP 
error attacks which is activated by requesting header section or packet in the data traffic 
with undefined functions [28]. Once header section is received, data information inside 
it can also be extracted and altered. Urgent pointer attack is also HTTP attack that sends 
a string of Out of Band (OOB) data that are independent in nature and leads to the 
malicious TCP packet. Urgent pointer is rarely used in the TCP header field but can 
lead to serious server failure and finance loss situations. And finally, Reset Attack that 
refers to resetting the system and it's done by sending reset flat information through the 
bot. The main function of the reset attack is to make the server busy and avoid ID 
processes. Among all the attacks mentioned above, common thing is that they are all 
controlled through C&C channel where attack types are based on attack intention [28]. 
 
As mentioned from news and enterprise [32], a study was conducted about dangerous 
botnets in 2012. The analysis showed that 9 dangerous botnets were encountered and 6 
out of 9 were related to HTTP Botnet [33]. The reason is that HTTP services are widely 
used all over the world and threats are transferring in huge amounts too. Those 6 





HTTP Bots Description 
1. Festi • Also known for the king of spam. 
• DDoS attack since 2009. 
• Intruded at least 250,000 IP addresses. 
2. Grum • Also known as Tedroo and Reddyb, largest botnet 
found. 
• Sends 18 billion spam messages per day. 
• Shutted down on July 19, 2012 due to 18% infection 
of worldwide spam traffic. 
• Operation relies on push configuration updates to the 
infected system and secondly sending through spam 
emails. 
• In 2010, infected approx. 840,000 computers 
delivering 39.9 billion spam messages making it 
largest botnet. 
3. Zeus • A Trojan horse that steals bank data also called "God 
of DIY". 
• Infects usually by downloads and through phishing. 
• Identified in July, 2007 while infecting US 
Department of Transportation. 
• By 2009 spreaded over 74,000 FTP accounts. 
• Infection sectors: ABC, Bank of America, Oracle, 
Cisco, Amazon and so on 
4. SpyEye • Like Zeus i.e. steal bank information and consumer 
credited information. 
• 278 SpyEye still active on stealing bank information. 
• First hacks the account and slowly hold the system, 
password and so on. 
• Follows transactions from victim's network to an 
unknown destination. 
5. Citadel • The fastest spreading botnet, within 1-year citadel 
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attacks were increased by 20%. 
• Information is sold to criminals.  
6. TDL-4 • One of the latest botnets. 
• Directly infected 250,000 victims. 
• Also known for TDSS or Alureon. 
• Hides from antiviruses and installs master boot record. 
• Can generate C&C domains making it difficult to 
track 
   
Table 4: HTTP Botnet and description [32]  
 
While analyzing on HTTP Botnets above, bot can send spam in millions of numbers per 
day and can take down thousands of FTP accounts at a time which is big intrusion. 
Thus, proper preventions or detection mechanism seems necessary to keep the protocol 
and devices safe. We will go through the detection section soon but before that let's 
discuss few famous related researches and detection processes in the next section below. 
5.2 Related Research Work 
Many research papers and experiments have been delivered for HTTP vulnerabilities 
and types of C&C. Choi [34] proposed HTTP botnet detection using study on Domain 
Name System(DNS) traffic, where the algorithm can monitor group activities and DNS 
resulting separation of doubtful traffic. Jae-Seo [29] followed United Progressive 
Alliance(UPA) process to detect periodic repeatability that monitors repeated similarity 
information between HTTP client/server. During the process, incoming and outgoing 
traffic’s behavior is compared with the normal traffic and any deviations are alerted as 
anomaly. Furthermore, many detection ideas were delivered covering data mining with 
its classification, clustering, machine learning and many more where popular HTTP 
based approaches are explained shortly below: 
 
i. Automated Layered approach for layered detection 
In this approach, an automated layered mechanism is used for the detection. 
Intrusion during the process is detected when the number of outgoing 
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packets is greater than the incoming threshold value. Next, the database is 
updated automatically with the intrusion record. After an update, the 
database is studied and detected intrusion is filtered out through the unit. 
Here, accuracy and performance of the threshold effects significantly to the 
result on detection [28]. 
 
ii. Genetic algorithm-based ID 
Genetic algorithm-based ID use information and similarity from previously 
detected botnets. The method contains pre-processing, extracting, testing and 
training phase where new traffic is compared through genetic operators. 
During the process, any similarity to mutation and crossover rings alarm for 
the intrusion. On one hand, process might be significant but since attack 
processes are evolving all the time, comparing security with old bots is not 
so good [28]. 
 
iii. DPR based botnet detection 
The Degree of Periodic Repeatability analyzes HTTP client/server relation 
by calculating direction and standard deviation repeatability of data traffic. 
The analysis helps to understand user's intention and intrusion process within 
the browser. Assumptions are made in a way that, if DPR of a connection is 
less, then there is the presence of HTTP botnet. DPR based detection is 
probabilistic, time-consuming and can only detect DDoS attacks [28]. 
 
iv. DNS traffic-based botnet detection 
DNS traffic-based botnet detection monitors group activities in DNS traffics 
and analyzes doubtful traffic behavior if it is a botnet or not. Algorithms in 
DNS based detection are implemented for botnet to use only DNS service at 
the initializing state and can never get into the system. In this process, 
botnet’s behavior in initial state is analyzed and bots are separated [28] 
 
All detection processes mentioned above are popular researches for HTTP botnet 
detection. HTTP botnet detection processes can also be based on Genetic algorithm and 
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pattern set mining. Furthermore, Botsniffer was discussed in the previous chapter for 
IRC channel and can also be used in HTTP botnet detection with similar process but 
different filtration algorithms. Just a little drawback is that Botsniffer works more 
efficiently for IRC Botnet than in HTTP Botnet [27] and thus in this chapter, we will 
discuss Adaptive Learning Neural Network method for HTTP detection. I found 
Adaptive Learning Neural Network method more efficient due to its adaptive behavior 
in detecting intrusion and is explained in next section below. 
 
5.3 HTTP Botnet Detection Using Adaptive Learning Neural Network 
Neural network is known as the future generation of computing that allows computers 
to think and react according to the situation. Neural networks models can classify 
internet users through its significant behavior like parallel processing of information, 
ability to recognize patterns and so on. In this section, we are going to discuss one of 
Neural Network method known as Adaptive Learning Neural Network for HTTP Botnet 
Detection [35]. 
Adaptive Learning Neural Network contains detection process with efficient learning 
rate that can adapt to previously recorded intrusion and can react efficiently to the 
doubtful traffic. The process can be operated significantly even when browser is 
refreshing, updating or operating with huge data flow in encrypted form [35]. 
Furthermore, the process has low FP rate than other neural models such as C4.5 
Decision Tree, Random Forest and Radical Basis Function being effective to detect 
dangerous bots like SpyEye, Zeus, etc [35]. In this section, combine study of detection 
algorithms, results, and evaluation is discussed that uses Multilayer Feed-forward 
Neural Network with adaptive learning. So, let's start shortly with detection process as 




Figure 10: Block Diagram of HTTP botnet detection [35] 
 
 
For HTTP botnet detection, firstly all network traffics are passed through pre-
processing where data information and moral behavior of traffic is studied as shown in 
Figure 10. Then based on the result, HTTP traffic is filtered out and is passed through 
testing/training phase for Neural Network testing. During the process, any doubtful 
traffic is directed through the classifier where the algorithm classifies presence of botnet 
or not. The whole process with algorithm for data filtration and evaluation is explained 
in coming sections below. 
5.3.1 Preprocessing and Normalization 
Preprocessing is the phase of separation on HTTP and doubtful traffic from the normal 
ones by studying TCP packet’s behavior. For an instance, when an infected bot is 
connected to the system, half of the open connections will increase. This results in 
variation of one-way connection ratio with the ratio of incoming and outgoing TCP 
packets [35]. On the other hand, in normal traffic, the number of SYN flag, FIN flag, 
and PSH changes randomly but when infected with HTTP bots these numbers stay 
mostly in fixed ratio. Thus, study on these features separates the traffic and doubted 
information's can be passed through normalization. The process can be performed as:  
 
One way ratio of TCP = 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑛𝑒−𝑤𝑎𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑇𝐶𝑃 𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝐶𝑃 𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠
*100 
• A ratio of Incoming Outgoing TCP packets = 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝐶𝑃 𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑔𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝐶𝑃 𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
• A ratio of TCP Packets = 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝐶𝑃 𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠
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• SYN Flag count = total number of TCP packets with SYN flag 
• FIN Flag count = total number of TCP packets with FIN flag 
• PSH Flag count = total number of TCP packets with PSH flag [35] 
 
5.3.2 Normalization 
Doubtful traffic obtained from the Preprocessing is filtered through Normalization to 
prevent neuron saturation. If preprocessed data is passed directly through the 
classification process, then there is high chance of neuron being saturated. If neuron 
gets saturated, then it leads to FP alarm in the output value. To prevent this situation, 
data is passed through normalization and is done through normalize feature extraction 
value "x” with Min-Max normalization [35]. 
 
 X’ = 
𝑥−𝑚𝑖𝑛"𝑥"
𝑚𝑎𝑥"x" − min "𝑥"
 , where 
 
X’ = Normalized value 
Min “x” = minimum value 
Max “x” = maximum value 
 
The normalization value obtained is then passed through classification where neural 
network training and tests are operated.  
 
5.3.3  Neural Network Classification 
Obtained result from the normalized value is passed through training and testing 
sessions followed by Multilayer networks. Firstly, in the training phase, normalized 
value is taken as input to a neural network where network weights and biases are 
organized for the degree of accuracy. Then trained values are passed through a testing 
phase where bold driver back-propagation algorithm is applied. The process contains 6 
neurons for the dimensionality of the input vectors resulting as one neuron.  
Furthermore, hidden layers are applied based on the complexity of the process [35]. 
Each neuron "i" in the input layer has signal "Xi" as networks input and each neuron "j" 
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in the hidden layer receives signal as ln(j) and are performed by the equation below 
[35]. 
5.3.4 Results and Evaluation 
Results and Evaluations are based on the experiments conducted by [35] in SSE lab 
with star physical topology and 100baseTX ethernet cable. During the experiment, TCP 
packets were retrieved from network traffic by taking sample in an interval of 5 
seconds. Traces were collected as 2 hours a day for five days in a week. In the traces, 
normal web traffic details were also obtained from National Knowledge Network 
having a bandwidth of 100Mbps. 
 
Table 5 shows traces collected from experiment as normalization and were analyzed for 
the selected features from normal web traffic. SpyEye and Zeus bots on the process 
were found as the zombies for email spamming.  
 
Bot Trace Trace Size Packets Number 
Zeus-1 5.85MB 53,220 
Zeus-2 4.13MB 37,252 
Spyeye-1 25.17MB 1.75.870 
Spyeye-2 3.90MB 35,180 
 
Table 5: Traces of different Web-based Botnets [35] 
 
According to datasets [35], 10250 normal traffic samples with 8500 Zeus and 8250 
SpyEye bot samples were taken for the experiment and ratio of one-way connection, 
incoming outgoing packets, as well as flag counts, were observed. Figure 11 shows high 
ratio and irregularity in bot's traffic from the normal traffic where normal traffic data 
flow ratio, PUSH Flag and Incoming-Outgoing ratio remained low level with less 
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complexity in correspondence to HTTP bots. 
 
Figure 11: One-way connection ration of TCP Packets [35] 
 
 
Figure 12: Ratio of Incoming Outgoing TCP Packets [35] 
 
 
Figure 13: TCP PUSH Flag [35] 
 
After obtaining values from normalization, doubtful traffic were passed through Neural 
Network Multilayered process resulting up to 99% accuracy on detection. Table 6 
below shows comparative results on detections using Adaptive learning method with 
Decision Tree, Random Forest, and RBF resulting SpyEye and Zeus as HTTP botnets. 
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Method Botnet Precision Recall F-Measure Accuracy 
Decesion 
Tree 
 0.968 0.931 0.949 96.5333 
Random 
Forest 
Spyeye 0.968 0.934 0.950 96.667 
RBF  0.976 0.927 0.950 96.5333 
Proposed 
Model 
 0.964 0.983 0.973 99.03 
Decision 
Tree 
 0.965 0.930 0.941 96.1333 
Random 
Forest 
Zeus 0.952 0.930 0.940 96.00 
RBF  0.959 0.922 0.940 95.8667 
Proposed 
Model 
 0.948 0.992 0.969 99.04 
Table 6: Performance Measures of Spyeye and Zeus Botnet [35] 
With above experiment and analysis, Adaptive learning method with neural network 
seems to give efficient result and very less False Positives for HTTP Botnet 
identification [35]. 
 
In this section, we discussed about Botnet behavior and Detection method with result 
analysis in HTTP protocol. So far, we understood the nature of botnets in the 
centralized server with its detection processes and test results. In next chapter, we will 
be diving through decentralized server and P2P Botnet which is more vulnerable and 







6 Peer-To-Peer Botnet 
P2P is a computer network where two or more than two computers are connected as 
peer for easy means of data transfer. All the connected computers in peer network act as 
both client and server and P2P botnet itself refers to botnet targeted for P2P networks 
[5]. Since all bots in the network can connect and communicate with each other, P2P 
botnet is an evolution to IRC, HTTP and efficient means of botnet for bigger attacks. 
All computer acting as client and server demolishes use of centralized network 
necessity and botmaster can operate efficiently even when ID filters certain bots. Upon 
filtration, other bots can continue spreading and cover the network as it was infected 
before. This feature of self-propagating brings quite a challenge in Computer Security 
and ID. Figure 14 explains similar information for communication among bots on a P2P 
network for intrusion [9]. In the figure, hacker from a remote location has attacked the 
targeted server through the help of available peer servers. Hacker takes the advantage of 
all computer acting as server and commands are passed generating individual computer 
as bot. After that, intended actions are passed to victim’s server for the intrusion [36]. 
 
 




There are many P2P bots from the early situation and first P2P botnet was noticed in 
2005 with the name ‘sinit'. After that, P2P Botnet has been evolving every year and 
some popular P2P botnets encountered are Napster, Direct Connect, Gnutella, eDonkey, 
Fast Track, WinMX, Ares, BitTorrent, WASTE, Kademlia, Zbot and many more [38]. 
More information on these botnets are explained in "Intrusion Example" section below 
starting with a common field as ‘Bootstrapping'. 
6.1 Bootstrapping 
Bootstrapping refers to a self-starting process of a computer known for booting. 
Bootstrapping is one of the start points for the P2P intrusion [39] For a bot to join the 
network, information on IP address of minimum one node is required and this is the 
situation where bootstrapping is used. Firstly, the bot is coded by botmaster with 
bootstrap servers and are deployed to the targeted network. When bot gets into the 
network, bootstrap server gathers information from other node IP addresses and 
provides the information to new bots being introduced to the network. During the 
process, bootstrap servers usually require signing credentials to prevent from ID and in 
many other cases for ID prevention, hacker provides invalid IP addresses remaining 
undetected [40]. 
 
In P2P network, all bootstrap servers are central point servers and one way to prevent 
intrusion is by shutting down all the servers. But, bringing down all the servers is not 
practically adequate, and the process wouldn't help much since bots are already on the 
system and becomes active whenever the server is turned on. However, the process can 
prevent other bots from joining. Taking advantage of such botnet's resilient behavior 
and decentralized server behavior, many P2P Botnets are designed and delivered in the 
network. Among many P2P Botnets, I am going to discuss few famous P2P Botnets in 
the next section below [40]. 
6.2 Famous P2P Botnets 
Most of the P2P Botnet attacks are found in Windows OS among which one is Sality. 
Sality was developed in 2008 and is estimated to be around 1,000,000 in number [9]. 
Computers infected with Sality can communicate over P2P for proxy communication, 
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spam mails, web server compromise, distributed computing, filtration of sensitive data 
and so on [9]. 
 
Another famous P2P Botnet is Conficker, also known for Downup and was introduced 
in 2008. It attacks MS OS and is estimated to be over 10,500,000. It uses dictionary 
attacks in Windows OS and extracts administration passwords as well as any sensitive 
information’s [9]. 
 
Ramnit, introduced in 2011 is a P2P botnet that affects Windows OS too. Ramnit is 
estimated to be 3 million and has infected around 800 000 Windows devices between 
September and December 2011. Later, it was dismantled by Europol and Symantic 
Security in 2015 [9]. 
 
ZeroAccess, also known for Sirefef or Max++ is a botnet introduced in 2011 that affects 
bit mining and click fraud. They are estimated to be around 2 million and uses Trojan 
horse to download other malwares. It has ability to infect computers, staying hidden 
inside the network [9]. 
 
Nitol, was introduced in 2012 and almost 85% of detected Nitol was found in China. It 
spreads malware and performs DDoS. It is also said that Nitol Botnets are installed 
during assembling and manufacturing process of the device. Thus, they are mainly 
found in brand new computers and devices [9]. Based on above information, I have 
created P2P botnet table for clear estimation in number and description below: 
 
Botnet Year Estimation Description 
Sality 2008 1,000,000 Proxy communication, spam emails. 
Conficker 2008 10,500,000 Windows OS dictionary attack. 
Ramnit 2011 3,000,000 Windows OS attack. 
ZeroAccess 2011 2,000,000 Bit mining and Click fraud. 
Nitol 2012 Unknown Spreads malware and DDoS attack. 
 
 Table 7: P2P Botnets [9] 
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6.3 Related Intrusion Detection Approaches 
Taking down all infected nodes have still been a challenging issue. But based on the 
size of P2P networks, many researches are delivered for P2P botnet detection. Among 
them, one is peer poisoning where a malicious node can be introduced for detection of 
doubtful IP addresses and activities. In this approach, all infected addresses can be 
separated from secured IP’s through enough malicious node distributed in the system 
[41]. 
 
P. Narang, et al. [42] on the other hand, approached for ‘PeerShark’, a research process 
to identify P2P botnet traffic and separate them from the normal traffic nodes. The 
process evolves 5-tuple flow-based detection to 2-tuple flow-based detection. 
Traditional 5-tuple flow contains IP address, port number, destination IP, port number, 
and protocol. However, in ‘PeerShark’ 2-tuple flow approach included port and protocol 
oblivious only. 
 
C. Dillion, et al. [43] explains detection of individual P2P bots within the network 
perimeter. The process is covered with P2P overlay network and NetFlow protocol for 
the analysis.P2P overlay network and NetFlow protocol compares incoming/outgoing 
data traffic within the node and doubtful traffic is considered as anomaly. During the 
testing, Zeus malware was taken in a limited access network where all incoming 
requests were taken inside the network and botnet was detected.  
 
D.Zhao, et al. [44] explained an approach to detect P2P botnet by machine learning 
classification techniques. The process explains feasibility of detecting an intrusion 
through time intervals, classification behaviors and experimental evaluation in 
comparison within the available network data. 
 
C. Rossow, et al. [45] presents graph model to observe the intrinsic feature and 
vulnerabilities of P2P botnets. Studying its behavior, matching doubtful data traffics are 
separated and detection measures are applied. 
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Karagiannis [36] approached an algorithm to separate botnet from the network. The idea 
is also based on the calculation of successful bot connections, analysis on node actions, 
application, and network. Based on observed value and analyzing it through the 
algorithm, P2P botnets are detected. 
 
Gizzard [8] has presented deep aspect on the storm of botnet detection where the 
process covers intrusion and communication behavior. Antti [2] has researched P2P 
botnet action feature and explained an idea on how to control them through Single Shot 
Text Detector(SSDT).  
 
Mathew [28] figured an approach to separate the net stream of Botnet from the normal 
traffic. Similarly, many ideas and research have been presented for P2P detection 
concerning communication delay time, hosts action, correlative behaviors and 
similarity. In next section, one of P2P botnet detection approach based on Algorithm 
Network Stream Analysis is explained to have clear view on how P2P botnets are 
filtered and detected. 
 
6.4 Algorithms Based on Network Streams Analysis 
P2P botnet shows character of paroxysm and distribution making botnets difficult to 
detect. Here, paroxysm relates to sudden attack and distribution relates to spreading 
behavior over network. In P2P, all machine works as server and when affected, all bots 
can perform sudden attacks and well as spread through the whole network. Furthermore, 
in P2P botnet, it is impractical to shut down all servers and single server failure doesn’t 
stop bots to perform the attack. Upon server failure, other bots can spread over the 
remaining active servers and continue the attack process. These features are marked 
important while approaching for P2P botnet detection method. P2P botnet can be 
detected mainly with two methods: Detection based on Protocol Feature Codes (DoPF) 
and Detection based on Network Streams (DoNS) [41]. Despite both methods are used 
for botnet detection, DoNS method is found to be more efficient than DoPF. It is 
because, in DoNS, the application is passed through the network data streams in 
Network Layer as well as Transport Layer. Furthermore, stream analysis process is 
relevant to decentralized platform with efficient result as well as veracity [41]. In our 
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case, Algorithm Based on Network Stream Analysis also uses DoNS to extract P2P 
Network traffic as well as P2P botnet behavior.  
 
In this section, DoNS model is presented based on three algorithms. Firstly, a method is 
applied to detect P2P nodes based on the paroxysm and distribution characteristic of 
Network stream. Then, clustering algorithm is applied, derived from K-mean 
Clustering. Finally, botnet detection algorithm is applied to doubtful actions of the bots. 
The overall process is followed by the model presented in Figure 15. 
Figure 15: P2P Botnet Detection Model [41] 
 
 
6.4.1  P2P Nodes Detection 
P2P Nodes Detection is the first step for Algorithm Based on Network Stream Analysis 
where P2P nodes are initially separated from whole traffic to reduce work load. This 
bypasses unwanted traffic and improves efficiency in ID. Since P2P nodes are 
decentralized, each node is connected with more subnet and network nodes. So, 
paroxysm degree(Sa) and distributed degree of node (Sd) is calculated respectively at 
time period(T) to receive P2P network node (S). Since, whole process is structural and 
lengthy, we will only talk about the experimental datasets and results received from the 
algorithm and filtration process [41].  
 
During the filtration process, three different kinds of P2P protocol applications 
(Bittorent, Emule and Kazaa) were analyzed with network stream characteristics. In this 
test, 100 nodes with 30 P2P nodes at time interval(T) = 60 minutes was taken to 
calculate (Sa) and (Sd). After applying the algorithm, P2P nodes were filtered and 



















(Sd) from 0.6. Since common nodes have lower values, we can see that P2P nodes were 
separated from other common nodes as shown in Figure 16. 
  
Figure 16: Nodes Distribution [41] 
 
6.4.2 P2P Nodes Clustering 
P2P Nodes clustering is second step on detection of P2P Botnet. P2P nodes received 
from P2P node detection section above is passed through clustering algorithm and are 
analyzed with P2P pair nodes behavior, stream, symmetry stats, quantity and frequency 
of data. In this process, suspicious traffic is filtered from normal traffic and the load for 
detection is reduced. Complete algorithms and explanation can be obtained from [41]. 
 
As for the example, let’s take a small section algorithm example of pair nodes to 
calculate connection degree of pair nodes Y(i,j), 
 
   Y(i,j) = ⅄1(Nij+Nji )+ ⅄2×kc ,  where  
 
N(i,j) = number of nodes(i,j), 
Kc = time of connection between the pair nodes (i,j), 
⅄1 & ⅄2 = constants 
 
After that, distance between the node (Dij) is calculated as, Dij=l/Yij. Finally, when the 
values are obtained, symmetry degree of pair or nodes are determined [41] and passed 
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through K-means Clustering to cluster P2P nodes. K-means Clustering is a popular 
method for data analysis using algorithms and understanding node behavior. It helps to 
determine similar behavior of doubtful traffic from the recorded datasets [41]. 
 
Regarding the experiment, 30 nodes each from Bittorent, Emule and Kazaa were taken 
and results obtained from K-mean clustering algorithm with different time intervals is 
shown in Table 8 below. Table gives list of protocols applied in time interval 1 hour, 1 
day, 10 days and 30 days respectively. It shows that by the time of 30 days, all nodes 
were clustered and matched with the Botnet behavior in K-means of Clustering. After 
separation, all nodes were passed through final step for botnet detection and determine 











1 hour Bittorrent 30 16 53 
Emule 30 18 60 
Kazaa 30 12 40 
1 day Bittorrent 30 24 80 
Emule 30 30 100 
Kazaa 30 26 87 
10 days Bittorrent 30 29 97 
Emule 30 30 100 
Kazaa 30 30 100 
30 days Bittorrent 30 30 100 
Emule 30 30 100 
Kazaa 30 30 100 
 




6.4.3 P2P-Botnet Detection 
P2P botnet detection is the final step for ID where suspicious traffics received from 
clustering process is passed through the detection algorithm. By comparing similar 
actions of the bots through algorithm, P2P botnets are detected. Algorithm used in this 
method is independent of botnet’s communication protocol and content [41].   
 
During the process, set of P2P nodes were taken as Sp = {S1, S2, Si….} and ΩN as 
subset of Sp. Furthermore, Rc, R, Rd, Re, R0 were calculated as scanning behavior, 
spam behavior, binary file downloading behavior, exploit behavior and DDoS behavior 
respectively. These values are obtained as, 
 
Rc = CΩN / NΩN, where, CΩN is number of nodes with similar scan behavior, 
Rs = SΩN / NΩN, where, CΩN is number of nodes with similar spam behavior, 
Rd = DΩN / NΩN, where, CΩN is number of nodes with similar downloading 
behavior, 
Re = EΩN / NΩN, where, CΩN is number of nodes with similar exploiting code 
behavior, 
Ro = OΩN / NΩN, where,  CΩN is number of nodes with similar DDoS behavior, 
 
For the test, three different kinds of P2P Botnets (Storm, Nugache and Slapper) were 
passed through the P2P-Botnet Detection algorithm for time interval 24 hour and result 
achieved is shown in Table 9 below [41]. 
 
Samples Rc Rs Rd Re Ro R 
No bots 0 0 0.7 0 0 0.7 
Storm 0.1 0.8 0.4 0 0.9 2.2 
Nugache 0.9 0 0.6 0 0.3 1.8 
Slapper 0.9 0 0.5 0 0.4 1.8 
 
Table 9: P2P-Botnet Detection Result [41] 
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From the result above, it is analyzed that storm’s main behavior is sending spams where 
as Nugache and Slapper does lots of scanning behavior. Furthermore, from the same 
table, Botnets individual activity in different attacks can also be seen. To summarize, 
P2P network stream analysis method is efficient to detect botnet, where P2P network is 




























7 Botnet Analysis 
Analysis of Botnet in this chapter shows concrete result of my research which is drafted 
from online research papers, University of Turku library books and real-life botnet 
examples mentioned in each chapter above. In the beginning of this Thesis, we went 
through botmaster, botnet commands, bot residing machines, bots purpose, anomalies 
and methods for IDS and many more. After that we discussed about Botnet Taxonomy 
i.e. IRC, HTTP and P2P Botnet. By this time, we noticed that individual botnet’s 
communication, scalability, server and interaction behavior varies among each other 
and detection algorithms are applied accordingly. Depending on Botnet behavior many 
software and applications like Botsniffer, Adaptive learning neural network and stream 
analysis were implemented to the network for Botnet detection. The identification, 
filtration techniques and algorithm used in Internet Relay Chat (IRC) is different from 
the ones used in Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Peer Network. These 
protocols are from different network and in individual chapter above, botnet’s 
taxonomy, behavior, intrusion examples, intrusion process, vulnerability and method for 
detection were shown with algorithm examples. Based on such individual botnet’s 
information, this chapter presents comparative analysis between each bot’s activity, 
behavior and vulnerability in upcoming sections.  
7.1 Botnet Behavior 
After going through all individual botnet behavior, I have analyzed that botnet is created 
with a combine study of target host programming, resilient indentation, decoding, data 
transfer, communication and C&C. Based on attack purpose, bot is designed to retrieve 
required information. While thinking from botmaster point of view, target host and 
security measures to be applied in the network is very important to study. If I am 
supposed to be a botmaster, I will be focusing on network drawbacks to deploy 
designed bots whether through internal/external drive or by distracting inside user’s 
behavior through phishing or fake advertises. After entering the system, bots can be 
deployed to decode commands and get access to the server performing any desired 
actions. Thus, before implementing any botnet detection approach, proper research 
within the network seems necessary and loopholes are needed to be figured out. 
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On the other hand, while comparing with viruses/malware, botnet is unique and highly 
destructive due to C&C. Computers infected with virus, bot and malware reacts on 
programming behavior and destructive nature. As virus enters the computer, it starts to 
spread and perform programmed attacks. Viruses cannot be controlled or changed once 
installed in the computer. But, bots can be controlled as silent and destructive nature on 
botmaster’s commands. Beside them, attacker can send commands to multiple bots at a 
time and can be designed to match the network environment such as IRC, HTTP and 
P2P Botnet. This enables Bot to act wise, be stable, more vulnerable and destructive in 
comparison to viruses and malwares. Furthermore, about vulnerability, botnet taxonomy 
itself has huge variation and common aspects within IRC, HTTP and P2P botnets itself. 
They are explained in next section below. 
7.2 IRC, HTTP and P2P 
When Botnet architecture is planned, it is taken into consideration for certain network 
protocol such as IRC, HTTP and P2P. Their target hosts, decoding process, spreading 
process, vulnerability and behavior are different with each other. Though their 
individual behaviors are different among each other, there are few things that always 
stays common among them. In this section, first I am going to discuss shortly about 
common aspects in botnet as well as detection and after that, detail analysis of 
individual botnet is presented.  
7.2.1 Similarity in Botnet Behavior 
While saying about similarity, C&C channel comes in the beginning which we might 
have already figured out. Whether it is IRC, HTTP or P2P, Botnets are always 
controlled through C&C channel, but the targeted servers can be single or many 
depending on the network. Another common thing among botnet is their silent nature. 
All Botnets can be programmed in a way to act silent or destructive based on attack 
nature and programming. This makes Botnet unique than viruses too where viruses are 
simply deployed to the network and any antivirus scan can detect them easily. As an 
exception, in IRC, this feature is available but not much implemented since they are low 
budget botnets and targeted mainly for small attacks. 
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Another common fact among botnet is botmaster’s trace. Botnets are controlled through 
botmaster’s commands and botmaster’s computer is usually far away from intrusion 
place. Being far, he can monitor targeted addresses. Not only that, botmaster can hack 
other IP addresses for the command to deploy and remain undetected. Furthermore, in 
all botnet intrusion, connection between bots, botmaster and server always needs to be 
active. Botmaster simply cannot just deploy bots and wait for the result instead need to 
establish communication and provide the commands.  
7.2.2 Similarity in Botnet Detection 
After common aspects among botnet behavior, let’s go shortly through similarity among 
detection principles. I have observed that all detection principle uses traffic filtration 
process in the beginning to reduce the traffic load and separate data traffic such as IRC, 
HTTP or P2P nodes. After that algorithms are applied to determine the botnet. Another 
is that, all detection process ends with notification alarm and buzz to notify the 
administration. They simply don’t act without observing the result manually by the 
observer and observer makes the clearing decision to avoid unwanted loss that might 
cause by false alarms. So, these were common behavior among Botnet as well as 
detection processes and in next section I will drive you through comparative analysis 
between IRC, HTTP and P2P botnets  
 
7.2.3 Comparative Differences 
Although this section targets for comparative differences, few botnet behaviors might 
have similarity among any two botnets and is different from the third one. For an 
instance, IRC and HTTP botnet operates through centralized server but P2P through 
decentralized. There are many other mutual similarities we will be discussing in this 
section targeting mainly for the differences.  
 
To figure out comparative differences, firstly research papers were studied explaining 
overview of botnet and its taxonomy. Then based on the taxonomy, IRC, HTTP, and 
P2P Botnet’s cases were studied as well as information's were collected. After that, 
individual ID algorithm and examples were analyzed with false alarms rate, accuracy, 
datasets, and results. Finally, with the help of collected points, I have merged a table 
where Botnets are compared with specific properties among each IRC, HTTP and P2P 
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botnet. Table also shows similarities as well as summarized description regarding botnet 
behavior. Table holds lots of points and thus is divided into multiple sub-tables to 
explain the content and make it understandable to the reader. Furthermore, for better 
understanding, similar properties are marked with similar under botnet behavior below.  
 
Properties IRC HTTP P2P 
Origin Started in 1993 
"Eggdrop" 
Started in 2003 
"Phabot" 
Started in 2005 
"sinit" 
Generation First Second Second 
Scalability  Good for small 
amount bots to 
deploy 
communication.  
Evolution to IRC. Can 
have a wide amount of 
bots. 
Evolution to IRC and 
HTTP. Multiple 
servers means more 
stable and robustness. 
Table 10: Botnet’s origin, generation and scalability 
 
Table 10 shows origin, scalability and generation properties of IRC, HTTP and P2P 
Botnet. It can be clearly observed that IRC is the first-generation Botnet that started in 
1993 as ‘Eggdrop’ whereas HTTP and P2P botnet started in 2003 and 2005 respectively 
with ‘Phabot’ and ‘sinit’. Regarding scalability, IRC botnet is targeted for small attacks 
where limited bots can be deployed but on the other hand, HTTP and P2P Botnets are 
used for larger attacks with wide range of bots that can bring any server down. 
 





Browsers Network, peers 




Uses 6667 IRC 
port. 
Uses TCP protocol 
and port number 80. 
Uses the port number 
from 10000 to 
30000. 
Table 11: Botnet’s Transmission, Command and Port 
 51 
 
Table 11 shows transmission, command and communication port properties among 
IRC, HTTP and P2P Botnet. In IRC Botnet, transmission happens through text 
messaging applications by PUSH command whereas with PULL command in internet 
browsers HTTP Botnet and both PUSH and PULL in P2P Botnet network nodes. 
Furthermore, about communication port, all IRC Bot uses 6667 ports to host C&C 
channels where HTTP Bot uses port number 80 in TCP protocol and P2P botnet uses 
port number between 10000 and 30000 through mesh topology.   
 
Properties IRC HTTP P2P 
Server Centralized with the 
central server. 
Centralized with the 
central server 
Decentralized server. 
Interaction Allows specific 
interactive behavior 
with bots. Botmaster 
knows the specific 
exploited bot. 
Need custom web-
server software for 
interactive behavior 
Allows interactive 
behavior with bots. 
Performance Easy handling and 
maintenance 
Easy handling and 
maintenance 
Hard to maintain and 
install but results in 
ID. 
Table 12: Botnet’s Server, Interaction and Performance 
Table 12 shows server type, interactive behavior and performance of IRC, HTTP and 
P2P botnets. There we can see that; IRC and HTTP uses centralized server whereas P2P 
uses decentralized. On the other hand, about interaction, IRC is the most interactive 
botnet and easy to handle from botmaster point of view whereas HTTP is less 
interactive in compare to IRC. HTTP needs custom web server software for interaction 
between bots and botmaster. Despite that, HTTP botnet can manage even large attacks 
with simple codes whereas IRC cannot. HTTP Botnet also uses Bulletproof hosting 
which is efficient for spamming through online gambling, gaming and dealing. While 
briefing about P2P Botnet, it allows interactive behavior, but their codes are complex 
and hard to maintain since all acts as client and server. 
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Properties IRC HTTP P2P 
Latency Low latency Low latency Long latency 
Bandwidth Uses low bandwidth. Uses low bandwidth. Uses high bandwidth. 
(BitTorrent, eMule, 
Kazaa and so on)  
Server Failure Single point sever 
failure 
Single point sever 
failure 
Single Server failure 
doesn’t affect for 
intrusion. 
Table 13: Botnet’s Latency, Bandwidth and Server Failure 
 
Table 13 shows latency behavior, bandwidth and server failure properties in IRC, HTTP 
and P2P Botnets. All three properties are somehow correspondent to centralized and 
decentralized server. IRC and HTTP has similar properties with low latency and 
bandwidth in correspond to P2P botnets. This is beneficial for centralized botnets but on 
the other hand, centralized Botnets are connected to only one centralized server and 
when that server is taken down, all bots inside it are passive too. Regarding this 
situation, P2P botnet doesn’t seem to be affected at all. Since there are multiple servers 
inside the network and when one server is down, bots can rely on other remaining 
servers. 
 
Properties IRC HTTP P2P 
Intrusion target Effects inbound and 
outbound IRC 
messages. 
Effects HTTP packets 
over web browsing 
through nodes. 
Effects network nodes 









First hijacks with 
small NODE section 
requests and spreads. 
Table 14: Botnet’s Intrusion target and requests 
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Table 14 shows intrusion target, requests and detection properties for IRC, HTTP and 
P2P Botnet. As IRC Botnet is designed for messaging application, it targets incoming 
and outgoing message information. On the other hand, HTTP botnet targets for HTTP 
packets throughout internet browsing history and P2P botnet targets network nodes 
within the topology. The process is handled in IRC Botnet through IRC PRIV request 
whereas HTTP POST REQUESTs in HTTP protocol and in P2P network, first small 
node section is hijacked through C&C requests and starts spreading throughout the 
whole network. 
 
Properties IRC HTTP P2P 
ID Method HIDS DIDS NIDS 
ID Efficiency Easy detection. Mild ID is complicated and 
difficult.  
ID False Alarms Low false alarm and 
high accuracy 
Low false alarm and 
high accuracy 
High false alarm and 
low accuracy 
Table 15: Botnet’s ID Method, Efficiency and FP 
 
Table 15 shows ID method, efficiency and FP among IRC, HTTP and P2P Botnets. 
Since messaging is done through host-based application, IRC takes Host based Intrusion 
Detection System whereas HTTP takes Domain based IDS and P2P takes Network 
based IDS simultaneously. 
 
Furthermore, about efficiency, IRC has small architecture and programs which is easy 
to be detected with high accuracy whereas P2P has complex designs and bot’s behavior 
are more resilient. In IRC, though IDS can easily destroy communication between bots, 
clients are still infected but as Botmaster is not able to give instruction it is not a threat 
to the application. Thus, to prevent this situation, clever Botmaster can always try to 
find nearby possible server and leave backup. About HTTP bots, they are not as easy as 
IRC to be detected but eventually with traffic analysis, infected packets can be 
recovered and taken down. On the other hand, P2P bots have complicated design and 
are also encrypted making ID challenging as well as hard to remove. Furthermore, in 
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P2P, bots can travel to multiple server and act as silent making the ID task more 
difficult.  
 
7.3 Intrusion and destruction 
Starting from IRC Botnet, many intrusion examples are mentioned in IRC intrusion 
Record section above where many servers were infected including AOL and ICQ. IRC 
botnets are targeted mainly for small attack with low budget where certain small tasks 
like messaging, spy, file recover and so on can be performed and are destroyed. No 
matter what it can be taken to the next level by deploying huge number of bots to 
applications and keep the server busy as well as shut down. But the process will be very 
costly and must deal with all the strong IDS algorithm. So, I think IRC are good to 
target for single application and just for monitoring user’s behavior. HTTP and P2P 
botnets on the other hand are introduced to reduce attack cost as well as increase 
efficiency for larger attacks. 
 
Regarding HTTP Botnets, it is dangerous mainly through its domain attacking behavior. 
In the chapter above, it has already been discussed about internet users in today’s world 
and browsing is being used in almost all corner of the world. Since, many people rely 
on browsing service, bots can be transferred easily and is able to hijack IP addresses of 
the device. Furthermore, browsing history, username and passwords can be recovered 
too leading for huge financial loss as well as blackmailing. 
 
P2P botnets so far, I feel the most vulnerable botnet among all genre due to its fast 
spreading and complexity in IDS. It can also be seen in intrusion examples above that 
each botnet can spread to million bots in number and can stay active with army for 
attack and as well stay silent during the low traffic time being undetected by IDS. 
Furthermore, these bots rely on server and in P2P there can be multiple servers, so 






Botnet can easily infect and control private computers and networks through C&C 
channel. Based on servers, bandwidth, network medium, protocol and so on all 3 types 
of Botnets are designed for individual purposes where IRC Botnet attacks through 
messaging application, HTTP Botnet targets domain-based packets and P2P Botnet 
targets network with multiple servers. In chapter 1,2 and 3, Botnet overview with ADT 
is mentioned. Moreover, in chapter 4, IRC Botnet and its detection methods were 
discussed whereas HTTP and P2P in chapter 5 and 6 respectively. 
 
In this thesis, I have analyzed Botnet taxonomy from an overview, origin, properties on 
origination and ID point of view and many more. Thesis holds all information about 
how and why Botnets are used as well as the reason for evolution to HTTP and P2P. 
Similarly, examples of ID are discussed in each Botnet chapter to show how detection 
algorithm works and false alarms are recorded.  
 
To summarize, Botnets are serious cyber security threats now and for future too. To 
save the network from intrusion, Botnet behavior should be studied, and preventive 
measures should be applied in time. This thesis provides comparative analysis on 
individual Botnet and shows guidelines for further research work on algorithms and 
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